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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EXPATRIATING THE DUAL NATIONAL*
Qui duabus civitatibus servire vult bonum advocatum
habere debet. Anon.
IN large part, those sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 which govern the divestment of United States citizenship 1 do not dis-
tinguish between expatriating persons who are dual nationals 2 and expatriat-
ing persons who are citizens of the United States alone. Like earlier statutes,3
*Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1958).
1. 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-89 (1952), as amended, 8 U.,C. § 1481.(a) (9)
(Supp. V, 1958). In accordance with common usage, this Note treats the terms citizen-
ship and nationality as synonymous. For a statutory differentiation, see 66 Stat. 238, 8
U.S.C. § 1408 (1952). See also 3 HACKWORTH, INTmATIoNAL LAW § 220 (1942); Note,
23 TEmp. L.Q. 399 (1950).
2. As used in this Note, the term dual national connotes a person who is a citizen
of the United States and at least one other country. Dual nationality arises from the
various combinations of laws through which citizenship may be conferred. 3 HACxWORTH,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 255 (1942); Harvard Research in International Law, Draft
Convention on Nrationality art. 10 [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention], 23 Am. J.
INT'L L. Sp'. Supp. 38-40 (1929); Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE
L.J. 545 (1921).
The two primary bases for conferring citizenship are jus soli, under which place of
birth is determinative of citizenship, and jus sanguinis, that is, the law of descent. 3
HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 221-22 (1942); 2 HYDE, INTERNATiONAL LAW
§§ 343-45 (1945); Draft Convention art. 3, 23 Am. J. INT'L L. SP. Surmp. 27-29 (1929).
See also Flournoy, supra at 550-54 (early American history on the use of these two
theories).
Since countries refuse to follow one basis uniformly, and in fact usually adopt both,
dual nationality is inevitable. See Draft Convention art. 3, 23 Am. J. INT'L L. Sp. SuP.
28 (1929) ; Flournoy, supra at 545. Thus, a child born in country A, which follows jus
soli, of parents who are citizens of country B, which follows jus sanguinis, is a citizen
of both countries. Sandifer, A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at
Birth and to Loss of Nationality, 29 Am. J. INT'L. L. 248, 259 (1935).
Dual citizenship also arises when a person naturalized by one country is still con-
sidered by the country of his previous allegiance as one of its nationals. See Orfield,
The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 427, 428 (1949) (also
listing other ways in which a person may become a dual national). For a survey of the
laws which nations use in determining whether citizens who have become naturalized in
other countries retain their original nationality, see U.S. DE'sT oF STATE, Pun. No. 6485,
INFORMATION FOR BEALRS OF PAssPoRTs 43-103 (1957). For a comprehensive review
of the present nationality laws of most nations, see LAws CONCEMING NATIONALITY,
U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/4 (1954).
3. E.g., Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228; Nationality Act of 1940, ch.
876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168.
The first legislation dealing with expatriation was enacted in 1868; Congress adopted
a policy of permitting a person to divest himself of his allegiance to any state. Act of
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the act specifies certain conduct which, if voluntarily undertaken, automatical-
ly results in loss of citizenship.4 As enlarged in 1940 and 1952, section 349
of the 1952 act 5 (section 401 of the 1940 statute) 6 lists ten acts of expatria-
tion, among them: "voting in political election in a foreign state" ;7 "taking
an oath ... of allegiance to a foreign state" ;8 "entering ... the armed forces
of a foreign state."9 One of these ten acts-accepting a job with a foreign
July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223. See Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 135-36
(1952); Borchard, Decadence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation, 25
Am. J. INT'L L. 312 (1931). See generally Liddell, The U.S. Position in Regard to the
"Right of Expatriation," 23 TmsP. L.Q. 325 (1.950).
In 1907, Congress expanded upon this policy by passing the first United States statute
to list acts of expatriation: naturalization in a foreign country, taking an oath of alle-
giance to a foreign country, and marrying a foreign male. Act of March 2, 1907, ch.
2534, 34 Stat. 1228. See also 41 CONG. REc. 1464-67 (1907) ; H.R. REP. No. 6431, 59th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1907); Roche, The Loss of Anerican. Nationality-The Developnwnt
of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. R-v. 25, 25-26 (1950). Congress's power to make
marriage to a foreigner an act of expatriation was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). But see Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 69-73
(1958) (dissenting opinion) (Mackenzie merely suspended citizenship) ; Nishikawa v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958) (concurring opinion) (Mackenzie should be partially
overruled).
4. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 133, 135-37 (1958), requires that the Govern-
ment affirmatively prove the voluntariness of an alleged expatriating act once the in-
dividual claims "duress." Although expatriation statutes have usually made no mention
of the voluntariness of the fatal conduct, courts have read that element into the statutes
in order to uphold their constitutionality. See Note, "Voluntary": A Concept in Ex-
patriation Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 932 (1954).
The 1952 act, 66 Stat. 268, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (1952), provides that:
any person who commits or performs any [expatriating] act specified in subsec-
tion (a) shall be conclusively presumed to have done so voluntarily and without
having been subjected to duress of any kind, if such person at the time of the act
was a national of the state in which the act was performed and had been physical-
ly present in such state for a period or periods totaling ten years or more im-
mediately prior to such act.
In light of Nishikawa, this conclusive presumption appears to be unconstitutional. See
Note, 54 COLUM. L. Ray. 932, 933 n.6 (1954). Contra, Developments in the Law-hIn-
migration and Nationality, 66 HARv. L. REv. 643, 734 (1953).
5. 66 'Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (9) (Supp.
V, 1958). See generally Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164
(1955); id. at 1164-65 (discussing the 1954 amendment which enlarged the treason-
divesting acts of the statute to include Smith Act-type convictions) ; Developments in
the Law--Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARv. L. Rtv. 643, 731 (1953) ; THE PREsi-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, REPORT-WHOM WE SHALL
WELCOME 235-44 (1953).
6. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168. See generally Roche, supra
note 3.
7. 66 Stat. 268, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (5) (1952).
8. 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (2) (1952).
9. 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3) (1952). The other listed acts include natu-
ralization in a foreign country, making a formal renunciation of United States nation-
1168 [Vol. 69:1167
EXPATRIATING THE DUAL NATIONAL
government -0 -- effects the expatriation only of dual nationals,1 ' specifically,
ality, wartime desertion, committing any act of treason, and remaining outside the United
States during war to avoid the draft. 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (1952), as
amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (9) (Supp. V, 1958). For a general discussion of the
statute see authorities listed at note 5 supra. The wartime desertion provision was held
unconstitutional in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.1S. 86 (1958). See note 27 infra.
10. 66 Stat. 268, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (4), (A) (1952). A person who is a citizen of
the United States alone, but who takes an oath of allegiance to a foreign power in order
to gain foreign employment, has committed an act of expatriation under 66 Stat. 268,
8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (4) (B) (1952).
1.1. Previous statutes had made little differentiation between dual and nondual na-
tionals. The 1940 act contained two provisions which applied only to dual nationals. The
first made service in the army of a foreign country cause for expatriation if the person
involved had or acquired the citizenship of that country. Nationality Act of 1940, ch.
876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1169. In 1952, this provision was made applicable to all United
States citizens who serve in foreign armies without the Secretary of State's permission.
66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3) (1952). For the view that this change wrongly
tends to create stateless individuals, see THE PPRESmNT'S CoantSSlOi ON IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION, RuoRT-WA O WE SHALL WELcoE 241-43 (1953).
The second specific reference of the 1940 act to dual nationals provided that, if a dual
citizen resided for six months or longer in the country of his other nationality, he was
presumed to have committed the expatriating acts listed under subsection (c) (serving
in the armed forces of his other state of nationality) or (d) (being employed by his
other state of nationality in a job which only nationals of that state were permitted to
hold). Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1169. This provision, which was
drastically revised in 1952 and is now § 350, was rarely applied and was particularly
aimed at a limited group of Hawaiians who served in the Japanese army. See Roche,
supra note 3, at 65-67.
Despite the fact that previous statutes made little distinction between the dual and
nondual national, they were clearly intended to eliminate the status of dual nationality.
See, e.g., 41 CoNG. Ra.. 1464 (1907); 86 CoNG. Rac. 11944 (1940).
The United States has also sought to limit the number of dual nationals by other
means. Various treaties limit citizenship to one nation. See, e.g., Convention on Natu-
ralization With Great Britain, May 13, 1870, 16 Stat. 775; Treaty With Prussia, Feb.
22, 1868, 15 Stat. 615; 3 HACKwoRTH, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 256 (1942); 2 Hva,
INTERNATIONAL LAw §§ 361-64 (1945). The expatriation statutes do not pre-empt these
treaties. 66 Stat. 272, 8 U.S.C. § 1489 (1952).
The United States has also attempted to eliminate dual nationality by restricting the
application of jus sanguinis. United States citizenship is conferred only on children, one
or both of whose parents are American citizens, and who have met requirements such as
specified residence in this country. 66 Stat. 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1952). In addition,
certain persons acquiring citizenship through jus sanguinis must reside in the United
States for five continuous years between the ages of fifteen and twenty-eight in order
to retain American citizenship. 66 Stat. 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1952). See Orfield,
supra note 2, at 433-34. Thus, jus sanguinis is normally not extended beyond the first
generation of children born outside the homeland. Compare Draft Convention art. 4, 23
Ams. J. INT'L L. Sp. Su'pp. 30 (1929) (suggesting that jus sanguinis not be applied be-
yond the second-generation of citizens habitually residing in a foreign country).
The United States also requires that anyone accepting this country's citizenship
through naturalization disclaim all allegiance to other countries. 66 Stat. 258, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1448 (1952). The effectiveness of this provision is limited, however, for many nations
will not accept such a disclaimer as ending their claims over naturalized Americans.
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of American citizens who are also citizens of the employing government.12
Generally, however, the statute treats Americans who are and are not dual
nationals similarly.13
Last year, in Jalbuena v. DuIles,14 the Third Circuit restricted with respect
to dual nationals certain section 349 provisions governing expatriation. Jal-
buena was born in the United States in 1920 of a Filipino father,15 and ac-
quired dual nationality at birth on the basis of ]fts soli and fus sanguinis.'0 At
the age of fourteen months, he was taken to the Philippines, where he resided
for over thirty years.17 In 1952, he obtained a Philippine passport and visited
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 6485, INFORMATION FOR BEARERS OF PASSPORTS C.g.,
97-99 (Turkey), 101-02 (U.S.S.R.) (1957); Sandifer, supra note 2, at 271-73.
12. In the 1940 act, this provision applied to any United States citizens acquiring
jobs ordinarily open only to nationals of the employing country. Nationality Act of 1940,
ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1169. See Roche, supra note 3, at 51-52.
The report of the House Committee on the Judiciary does not indicate why the pro-
vision's applicability was limited by the 1952 revision to dual nationals. H.R. Rn'. No.
1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1952). The National Council on Naturalization and Citizen-
ship endorsed the 1952 amendment because it tended to decrease the incidence of state-
lessness. Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary
on S. 716, H.R. 2379, and H.R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1951). In one sense, the
applicability of the provision was broadened, since it now applies to all employment by
a foreign government, not merely to those jobs ordinarily open to nationals. See Dc-
velopments in the Law-Imnmigration. and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REv. 643, 736 (1953).
The sole other statutory provision keyed exclusively to dual nationals, § 350, makes
the "claiming of benefits of the nationality of a foreign state" an additional ground for
expatriating persons who acquired two nationalities at birth, resided for three years in
the country of their other nationality, and failed to take an oath of allegiance to the
United States during that period. 66 Stat. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1952). As originally
proposed, § 350 divested the dual national of his citizenship only if he resided abroad for
the three-year period and did not come under the complicated saving clauses. H.R. RPp.
No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 87, 303-04 (1952). But the House-Senate Conference Com-
mittee inserted the stipulation that § 350 would not apply unless the dual national volun-
tarily sought the benefits of his foreign nationality. This provision was intended to limit
expatriation to instances involving an affirmative act by the dual national. H.R. REP. No.
2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1952). See also Developments in the Law--Innnigration
and Nationality, 66 HAnv. L. REv. 643, 738-39 (1953) ; THE PRESIDENT'S COtMISSION
ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, REPORT-WHoM WE SHALL WELCOMnE 240-41,
282 (President's Veto Message to the House of Representatives) (1953).
13. See LowENSTEIN, THE ALImEN AND THE IMMIGRATION LAw 345 (1958). Section
350 does not pre-empt § 349 which also applies to dual nationals. See 22 C.F.R. § 50.6
(1958) (State Dep't Reg.) ; Carliner, The )ininigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
20 J.B.A.D.C. 392, 397 (1953) ; Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1958).
In fact, § 349(a) (4) (A) can be applied only to dual nationals.
14. 254 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1958).
15. Findings of fact of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania [hereinafter cited as Findings], reported in Brief for Appellant [hereinafter cited
as Brief], p. 2a.
16. See Conclusions of Law of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania [hereinafter cited as Conclusions], reported in Brief, p. 7a. For a dis-
cussion of Jis soli and fus sanguinis, see note 2 supra.
17. Findings, Brief, p. 3a.
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his mother in the United States.'8 To acquire the passport, he was required
to swear to "support and defend the Constitution of the Philippine Islands
from enemies, foreign and domestic * * * [and to] bear true faith and alle-
giance to the same * *1- * ."19 Although, at the time he took the oath, Jalbuena
knew that he had been born in the United States, he was unaware of the fact
that he was an American as well as a Philippine citizen.20 After arriving in
the United States and learning of his dual nationality, he requested the De-
partment of State to confirm his American citizenship. 2' But the Department,
relying on section 401 of the 1940 act 22 (section 349 of the 1952 act) ,23
determined that his citizenship had been lost through the commission of a
proscribed act-taking an oath to support a foreign government. 24 Subse-
quently, a federal district court refused Jalbuena relief and approved the State
Department's ruling.2 5 On appeal, the Third Circuit, reversing, held that Jal-
buena had not renounced his allegiance to the United States and therefore
had not lost his citizenship.
2 6
The court of appeals acknowledged that three recent Supreme Court de-
18. Findings, Brief, p. 3a; 254 F.2d at 380.
19. Findings, Brief, pp. 3a-4a; 254 F.2d at 380.
20. Findings, Brief, p. 4a; 254 F.2d at 380.
21. Findings, Brief, pp. 4a-5a.
22. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1164.
23. 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2) (1952).
24. See Findings, Brief, p. 5a.
In the principal case, the Third Circuit accepted the standard definition of an oath
made by Secretary of State Hughes, in 3 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 219-20
(1942). 254 F.2d at 381-82 n.2. Under that definition, an oath must be of the type which
completely subjects the person taking it to the liabilities and duties of foreign citizenship.
It is the spirit and meaning of the oath, and not merely the letter, which is to
determine whether it results in expatriation. It is not a mere matter of words.
The test seems to be the question whether the oath taken places the person taking
it in complete subjection to the state to which it is taken, at least for the period
of the contract, so that it is impossible for him to perform the obligations of
citizenship to this country.
Ibid.
Jalbuena argued that he had not taken an oath meeting this definition. Brief, pp. 4-12.
The Third Circuit did not reach this argument as such.
For the varying content given the word "oath," compare Savorgnan v. United States,
338 U.S. 491, 495, 501 (1950), Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445, 455 (N.D.N.Y. 1916),
and Federici v. Miller, 99 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1951), with Lehmann v. Acheson,
206 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 1953), and Fletes-Mora v. Rogers, 160 F. Supp. 215, 217-20
(S.D. Cal. 1958).
As a minimum, an oath, to effect expatriation, must be officially required, and must
be administered by a competent government official. Also, the person taking the oath
must be mentally competent. See 3 HACKWORTH, INTERNATlONAL LAW 218-19 (1942);
Roche, sutpra note 3, at 33, 36.
25. Conclusions, Brief, p. 7a; 254 F.2d at 380. The district court's decision was not
reported.
26. 254 F.2d at 382.
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cisions, especially Perez v. Brownell,27 indicate "that within reasonable limits,
not yet precisely defined, Congress can make and has made a forfeiture of
citizenship the legal consequence of voluntary conduct which, in legislative
judgment, embarrasses our government in its international relationships. '28
But, the Third Circuit continued,
the Court [in the Perez case] has gone no further than to approve for-
feiture of citizenship under Section 401 where the nature and circum-
stances of the allegedly expatriating conduct have been such as to indi-
cate some flouting of obligations inherent in American citizenship, if not
an implied renunciation of the tie.
2 9
Apparently treating "flouting" and "renunciation" as synonymous,30 the Third
Circuit held that neither was present in the principal case because Jalbuena,
by taking an oath in order to obtain a passport, had merely asserted a right
of his other nationality which in no way clashed with his American citizen-
ship.31 "[C]onduct merely declaratory of what one national aspect of dual
citizenship necessarily connotes, cannot reasonably be construed as an act of
renunciation of the other national aspect of the actor's dual status. '32 The
court found support for this rule in a statement by the Supreme Court in
Kawakita v. United States: "The mere fact that... [a dual national] asserts
the rights of one citizenship does not without more mean that he renounces
the other." 33
The Third Circuit thus revived a confusing Supreme Court decision and
converted it into a general rule.34 In Kawakita, a jury had found a national
of the United States and Japan guilty of committing treasonous acts against
captured Americans during World War 11.35 Unlike the usual case in which
27. 356 U.S. 44 (1958), Comment, 56 MIcH. L. Rav. 1142 (comment on all three
decisions).
The two other cases cited by the Third Circuit were Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), and Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958). In Trop, § 349(a) (8) of the
1952 Nationality Act (expatriation for wartime desertion) was characterized as provid-
ing for unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. For a comprehensive discussion
of cruel and unusual punishment as it relates to the expatriation statute, see Comment,
64 YALE LJ. 1164, 1178-1200 (1955). The Ntshikawa case is discussed note 4 supra; for
its probable effect, see note 75 infra.
28. 254 F.2d at 381.
29. Ibid.
30. At one point, the Third Circuit seemed to indicate that "flouting" and "renun-
ciation" are distinguishable. 254 F.2d at 381. But the court applied a general rule rest-
ing solely on renunciation: "It follows that, because nothing done by Jalbuena can fairly
be viewed as a renunciation of the United States citizenship he enjoyed simultaneously
with Philippine citizenship, Section 401(b) cannot properly be read as applying to his
conduct." Id. at 382. (Emphasis added.)
31. Id. at 381.
32. Ibid.
33. 343 U.S. 717, 724 (1952), cited in 254 F.2d at 381. The Jalbuena court also cited
Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1953), an opinion based on Kawakita.
34. On the confusing aspects of the case, see note 38 infra.
35. 343 U.S. at 719-20.
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the Government attempts to prove expatriation over the protests of the de-
fendant, expatriation was there alleged as a defense.36 The Supreme Court
dictum which the Jalbuena court relied on went to the reasonableness of a
jury finding which was only arrived at after eight days' deliberation.37 The
finding, essential to holding Kawakita responsible under American law for his
heinous conduct, was that Kawakita had not committed an act of expatria-
tion and therefore still owed allegiance to the United States when he com-
mitted an act of treason.3 8 In elevating the Kawakita dictum to a general
limitation on the Nationality Act's expatriation provisions, Jalbuena ignored
the procedural posture and emotional context in which the dictum was em-
ployed.39
36. See Kawakita v. United States, 190 F.2d 506, 513 (9th Cir. 1951).
37. 343 U.S. at 724-27. On the jury aspect of the case see note 39 infra.
38. 343 U.S. at 722.
On the heinous aspects of his conduct, see note 39 infra.
The references to "intent" in the Kawakita; decision are exceedingly ambiguous. The
Court indicated that the determination of Kawakita's intent was a jury matter. 343 U.S.
at 726-27. But the charge to the jury had stated that Kawakita could only be expatriated
by performing one of the acts set out in § 401 of the 1940 statute. United States v.
Kawakita, 96 F. Supp. 824, 842 ( S.D. Cal. 1948) (jury charge 11-G(2)). It would thus
appear that the issue presented to the jury was whether Kawakita had performed any
§ 401 acts, not whether his conduct demonstrated that he intended to renounce his citizen-
ship. Since Kawakita's conduct, as the Court viewed it, was equivocal, his intent might
have been considered relevant in determining whether his conduct included one of the
§ 401 acts. See 343 U.S. at 723. The Supreme Court's Kawakita decision might also be
interpreted, however, as introducing subjective-intent-to-renounce as a separate criterion
for ascertaining whether expatriation has occurred. See 343 U.S. at 726; Notes, 15 GA.
B.J. 239, 241, 26 So. CAL. L. REv. 438, 440 (1953) (both adopting this interpretation).
If so, Kawahita is definitely out of line with prior and succeeding decisions. See Perez
v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 61 (1958); Note, 54 COLum. L. Rv. 932, 945 (1954).
The intent issue was further confused by the fact that, if Kawakita had not expatriated
himself but thought that he had renounced his American citizenship, he could not have
been convicted of treason because he lacked the necessary inens rea. Intent therefore
could have been a factor bearing on whether or not he had committed treason. See 343
U.S. at 732. In sum, it is difficult to ascertain with precision whether the Supreme Court
viewed intent as a separate prerequisite to expatriation, or only as evidence in determin-
ing whether Kawakita committed a § 401 act, or as an element of the crime of treason.
See 343 U.S. at 724.
The Kawakita opinion is also puzzling because of its seemingly favorable statements
about dual nationality. The opinion thus appeared to contradict the previous Supreme
Court decisions and the articles which it cited, 343 U.S. at 723 n.2. Compare 343 UJS.
at 723-25 with, e.g., Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 500 (1950); Mackenzie
v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915) ; Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE
L.J. 545, 545-46 (1921); and Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 427, 438, 442-45 (1949).
39. The Kawakita case was one of the most highly publicized and dramatic trials
in recent American history. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1948, p. 40, cols. 2-3; id., Oct. 6,
1948, p. 15, cols. 2-3; id., Feb. 5, 1952, p. 2, col. 2; id., June 3, 1952, p. 25, col. 1; id.,
Dec. 13, 1952, p. 11, col. 1; id., Nov. 3, 1953, p. 56, col. 5; id., Nov. 4, 1953, p. 34, col. 5.
The three-month long trial unfolded a long list of heinous and brutal crimes which the
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The general rule erroneously derived from Kawakita would frequently pre-
clude the expatriation of dual nationals under the terms of section 349. Vot-
ing in a political election in the country of the other nationality, serving in
that country's armed forces, and taking an oath of allegiance to that country
would not constitute renunciation of United States citizenship-the Third
Circuit's prerequisite for expatriation. Acts of this sort would fit within the
Kawakita-Jalbuena definition of conduct which serves only to reaffirm the
dual national's right to claim the benefits and assume the liabilities related to
his other nationality; these acts would merely be "declaratory of what one
national aspect of dual citizenship necessarily connotes" and therefore could
not "reasonably be construed as an act of renunciation.
'40
True, both Kawakita and Jalbuena implied that a dual national's conduct,
if it "clashed in any way" with his responsibilities as an American citizen,
would evidence renunciation. 41 But the holdings of both cases give this quali-
fication little content. In Kawakita, the Court refused to rule as a matter of
law that various wartime acts of the defendant constituted anything more than
a declaration of his existing Japanese nationality. 42 Although he had registered
in a family census book evidencing Japanese allegiance, 43 traveled on a Japa-
nese passport,44 removed his name from a Japanese alien-registration list,"l i
and made statements against the United States to United States citizens, 4
the Court held that the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Kawakita had not renounced his American citizenship. 47 The Jalbuena court
took almost as narrow a view of conduct clashing "in any way with any re-
sponsibility of . . . American citizenship. '48 Holding that the oath at issue
defendant allegedly committed against American prisoners of war. Kawakita v. United
States, 190 F.2d 506, 510 n.4 (9th Cir. 1951). See also note 46 infra (statements Kawa-
kita made to the prisoners). It took eight days and repeated consultations with the judge
for the jury to reach a verdict. At a hearing to overrule the verdict on grounds of un-
due influence upon the jury, one juror collapsed on the witness stand. N.Y. Times, Oct.
6, 1948, p. 15, cols. 2-3. See also 190 F.2d at 521; 96 F. Supp. at 831-35 (discussing the
jury's difficulties in reaching a verdict).
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction by a 4-3 vote. See Carrington, The Su-
preme Court: The Problem of Minority Ophions, 44 A.B.A.J. 137 & n.2 (1958). The
case finally ended in 1953, six years after it started, when President Eisenhower com-
muted Kawakita's death sentence to life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The President's
action came after he had received thousands of letters from this country and abroad.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1953, p. 56, col. 5.
40. 254 F.2d at 381.
41. ,See ibid., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1952).
42. Id. at 724.
43. Id. at 720, 724.
44. Id. at 723.
45. Id. at 722.
46. Id. at 725. The statements are reported at Kawakita v. United States, 190 F.2d
506, 516-17 n.13 (9th Cir. 1951).
47. 343 U.S. at 727.
48. 254 F.2d at 381.
In one respect, the view taken in Jalbuena was even narrower than that taken in
Kawakita. The Kawakita decision merely refused to hold that a reasonable doubt existed
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was not incompatible with the duties of an American national, the court evi-
dently did not consider that support of the Philippine Constitution might
at times be inconsistent with the interests of the United States. 49 In stun,
both Kawakita and Jalbuena suggest that, with respect to dual nationals, most
section 349 acts are "merely declaratory"' 0 of an existing obligation to an-
other citizenship; and that renunciatory conduct must be flagrant indeed to
terminate a dual national's American citizenship.
The Third Circuit may have felt driven to negative the concept of renun-
ciation because established doctrine makes it irrelevant that Jalbuena did not
know of his American citizenship when he took the Philippine oath. The
Supreme Court has long held that the performance of a section 349 divesting
act evidences an objective intent-to-renounce sufficient to warrant expatria-
tion.r' To avoid the harshness of the objective-intent standard, courts have
expanded the defense of "duress," a defense which justifies the commission
of a divesting act . 2 For example, a Japanese dual national was viewed as
over whether Kawakita had in fact renounced his American citizenship through the per-
formance of conduct which clashed with the responsibilities attaching to that citizenship.
The Jalbuena court, on the other hand, held as a matter of law that Jalbuena had not
renounced his citizenship.
49. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445, 455 (N.D.N.Y. 1916) ; Fracassi v. Kar-
nuth, 19 F. Supp. 581, 583 (N.D.N.Y. 1937); H. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 23
(1906); Note, 54 COLUm. L. Rzv. 932, 938-39 (1954); Developments in the Lau---Im-
migration and Nationality, 66 HARv. L. REv. 643, 733-36 (1953) ; Flournoy, supra note
38, at 693, 702.
Philippine-American relations have not always been harmonious as evidenced by the
bitter and prolonged conflict over American military bases and personnel located in the
Philippines. The dispute seems closely tied with domestic Philippine politics. See N.Y.
Times, July 1, 1956, p. 18, col. 1; id., July 4, 1956, p. 1, cols. 2-3; id., p. 2, cols. 2-8;
id., Sept. 4, 1956, p. 10, col. 1; id., Sept. 25, 1956, p. 3, col. 2; id., Dec. 6, 1956, p. 1, col.
1; id., p. 18, col. 5; id., Nov. 20, 1957, p. 10, cols. 4-5. Quaere: what part, if any, may
Jalbuena take in this domestic dispute?
50. 254 F.2d at 381.
51. E.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1958) ; Savorgnan v. United States,
338 U.S. 491, 499-502 (1950); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915); Acheson v.
Wohlmuth, 196 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1952). But see Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62
('1958) (dissenting opinion) ; Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138 (1958) (concurring
opinion).
52. E.g., Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958) (Government must affirmatively
prove voluntary character of act) ; Stipa v. Dulles, 233 F.2d 551. (3d Cir. 1956) (eco-
nomic duress a defense) ; Augello v. Dulles, 220 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1955) (conscription) ;
Kuwahara v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (influence of American occupa-
tion forces) ; Nakashima v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (fear of interfer-
ence with plans to return to United States).
Rather than use "duress" to preclude expatriation, the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii repeatedly held the pertinent provisions of the Nationality
Act unconstitutional. Murata v. Acheson, 99 F. Supp. 591 (D. Hawaii 1951), rev'd on
other grounds, 342 U.S. 900 (1952); Okimura v. Acheson, 99 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii
1951), ree'd on other grounds, 342 U.S. 899 (1952), unconstitutionality reaff'd, 1.11 F.
Supp. 303 (D. Hawaii 1953).
For a comprehensive analysis of "duress" as employed in expatriation cases, see Note,
54 CoLuM. L. REv. 932 (1954).
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having acted under "duress" if "forced" to vote in a Japanese election by the
head of his family." In Jalbuena, however, duress, be it Pickwickian or actual,
was lacking, and the court may consequently have considered Kawakita to
offer the only escape from the rigors of the objective-intent doctrine. 4
The Third Circuit could have circumvented that doctrine instead of evis-
cerating it. The Supreme Court cases which announced the objective-intent
rule all turned on acts committed by nationals who were aware of their
American citizenship and who realized that their conduct related to foreign
citizenship or allegiance, although they may not have known Congress had
stipulated that their acts would effect expatriation. 5 Thus, under these cases,
a United States citizen who was uninformed as to the statute could still make
a choice. He could reject any indicium of foreign citizenship, or he could
voluntarily accept a benefit or duty of foreign citizenship and assume the risk
of a previous congressional determination that his conduct evidenced renun-
ciation.5 6 Jalbuena did not have this choice since he was unaware of his dual
nationality. Therefore, by restricting the objective-intent rule to the facts of
the cases enunciating it, the Third Circuit could have freed itself to consider
subjective intent in Jalbuena.57 Although this rationale would restrict the doc-
trine of objective-intent, it would be more in harmony with previous judicial
attitudes toward expatriation 58 than the court's substantial preclusion of im-
plied renunciation in cases involving dual nationals.5 9
Irrespective of the reasoning employed to support the conclusion that Jal-
buena did not renounce his American citizenship, the Third Circuit erroneous-
ly held that renunciation is a prerequisite of expatriation. True, prior to Perez
53. Takehara v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1953).
54. Compare Soccodato v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 243, 247 (DC. Cir. 1955) ; Takehara v.
Dulles, 205 F2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1953) ("Most courts seem to have attempted to
repeal the statute by a 'liberal' interpretation of the word 'voluntary.'); id. at 562 (dis-
senting opinion).
55. 'See Comments, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1154-57 (1958) ; 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1177-
78 (1955). See also Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 69-75 (1958) (dissenting opinion);
Savorgnan v. United States, 338 US. 491, 494-95, 502 (1950).
56. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 61-62 (.1958) ; Savorgnan v. United States,
338 U.S. 491, 499-502 (1950) ; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915).
57. In fact, a previous Third Circuit decision had suggested by way of dictum that
a person who is unaware of his American nationality cannot renounce it. Perri v. Dulles,
206 F.2d 586, 591 (3d Cir. 1953).
Unawareness of American citizenship was recently raised as a defense in an expatria-
tion case; the court did not render a decision, but did indicate that the Supreme Court
might have precluded such a defense in Savorguan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
Fletes-Mora v. Rogers, 160 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D. Cal. 1958). The Savorgnan case is
distinguishable, however, since Mrs. Savorgnan had known that she would have to be-
come an Italian citizen before she could marry her prospective husband; and, knowing
this, she applied for Italian citizenship. 338 U.S. at 494.
58. See authorities cited and text accompanying note 55 supra.
59. Previous Supreme Court cases have found dual nationality undesirable and have
recognized the congressional desire to eliminate that status. See Savorgnan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 491, 500 (1950) ; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311. (1915).
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v. Bro'wnell, expatriation was usually occasioned by renunciation. 60 But, as
the Jalbuena court conceded, Perez and other recent Supreme Court decisions
have established a separate basis for expatriation-the power of Congress to
regulate foreign affairs. 1 Within reasonable limits, therefore, Congress may
expatriate persons who commit acts which are potentially embarrassing to
the United States in its foreign relations. 62 The Third Circuit read the Perez
case itself, however, as approving expatriation for acts which were both poten-
tially embarrassing to the Government and indicative of a "flouting of obliga-
tions inherent in American citizenship, if not an implied renunciation of the
tie."0 3 This reading of Perez is inaccurate. That decision rested explicitly on
Congressional power over foreign affairs, on the view that Congress may rea-
sonably characterize voting in a foreign political election as a potential for-
eign embarrassment, and on a finding that expatriation is a reasonable way
to eliminate this source of embarrassment. 64 To be sure, Perez also pointed
out that, in the eyes of Congress, to vote in a foreign political election is to
evince less than complete allegiance to the United States.65 But the very con-
tent and wording of this observation show that the Court, speaking to the
reasonableness of the congressional determination, was simply suggesting that
the expatriation of Perez might also have been upheld on a "flouting" or
"renunciation" theory.661 Clearly, no limitation on the "foreign embarrass-
ment" rationale was intended.67  In denying expatriation "because nothing
done by Jalbuena can fairly be viewed as a renunciation,"08 the Third Circuit
missed the thrust of Perez. 9
Nevertheless, Perez may properly be deemed inapposite whenever the pos-
sibility of foreign friction is de ninimis.70 Previous Supreme Court decisions 71
60. See Comment, 56 Mica. L. REv. 1142, 1147-57 (1958) ; Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv.
118, 1.19-20 (1958).
61. 254 F.2d at 380-81.
62. 254 F.2d at 381.
63. Ibid.
64. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57-61 (1958), see Comment, 56 MicH. L. REv.
114243, 1158; Note, 47 GEo. L.J. 177; The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. REv.
77, 167.
65. 356 U.S. at 60-61.
66. See Comment, 56 MicH. L. Rrv. 1142, 1166 (1.958).
67. None of the commentary on Perez suggests that such a limitation was intended
or can be read into the opinion. See Note, 44 AJB.A.J. 565; Note, 25 BRooKLYN L. REv.
113; Note, 47 GEo. L.J. 177; The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv. L. Rzv. 77, 166;
Comment, 56 MicH. L. REv. 1.142; Note, 30 Miss. L.J. 76; Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv.
118 (1958).
68. 254 F.2d at 382.
69. See Note, 107 U. PA. L. Rxv. 118, 122 n.27 (1958).
70. See Note, 47 Gzo. L.J. 177, 179-80 (1958).
71. See, e.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Helvering v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935) (dictum); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934) (dictum); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1928).
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and, to a degree, the majority opinion in PereZ 7 2 have recognized that "due
process" imposes a limit of reasonableness upon all legislation; that statutory
prescriptions must have a "substantial relation" to the fulfillment of valid
congressional objectives. 3 Of course, as the majority opinion pointed out,
Congress must be permitted "ample scope" for eliminating any possibility of
foreign embarrassment.7 4 But the Supreme Court has long recognized that
denial of citizenship is a singularly drastic sanction and one not to be lightly
undertaken. 75 On balance, then, transforming a single national like Perez into
a stateless pariah 76 would seem an unreasonable exercise of legislative power
when the danger of foreign entanglement is slight.77 Indeed, Perez's voting
72. 356 U,S. at 58.
73. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); see Note, 47 GEo. L.J. 177,
179-80 (1958).
74. 356 U.S. at 60; cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
320 (1936); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
75. E.g., Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 134 (1958) ; Gonzales v. Landon, 350
U.S. 920 (1955); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
Because divestment of citizenship entails onerous consequences, the Government must
prove the voluntary character of an expatriating act by "clear, convincing, and unequiv-
ocal evidence." Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra at 138. The lower federal courts will prob-
ably use this standard to limit the effect of Perez. See Gonzalez-Jasso v. Rogers, Civil
No. 14626, D.C. Cir., March 5, 1959; Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1958).
See also The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HAxv. L. REV. 77, 172 (1958); Note, 30
Miss. L. REv. 76, 78 (1958). Gonzalez-Jasso held that the plaintiff's previous statements
under oath that he had voted in a foreign election were not sufficient evidence to establish
that he had actually voted. Civil No. 14626, D.C. Cir., at 6-7.
76. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 84 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958); Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1186-1200 (1955);
Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 427, 442 (1949) ;
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15, approved by the United
Nations General Assembly in Paris, Dec. 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810, reprinted in UNESCO,
HUMAN RIGHTS, A SYmPosium app. III, at 276 (1949). Perez is generally recognized
as the first Supreme Court case in which a nondual national was divested of United
States citizenship. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 80 (1958) (dissenting opinion) ; Note,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 118, 121 (1958). For a district court decision expatriating a nondual
national, see Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1916).
The Court in Perez regarded plaintiff as a national only of the United States. But,
if his parents were Mexican citizens (as they likely were), he would have been a dual
national, and his expatriation would not have made him stateless. See Comment, 56 Micu.
L. REv. 1142, 1159 n.82 (1958).
77. The Perez decision has been generally criticized as having permitted Congress
to exceed the constitutional restrictions imposed on the foreign-relations power, especial-
ly in view of the fact that the foreign embarrassment inherent in voting is either non-
existent or slight. See, e.g., Comment, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 1142, 1158-59 (1958) ; Note, 107
U. PA. L. REv. 1.18, 121 (1958).
For background and analysis of the statutory voting provision, see Roche, The Loss
of American Nationality-The Development of Statuttory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. Ray.
25, 52-54 (1950); Schwartz, The Supreme Court-1957 Term, 57 MIcH. L. Ra. 315,
323-27 (1959); Note, 54 CoLutr. L. Rrv. 932, 936-37 (1954).
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in a Mexican election-the basis of his expatriation-may have been de Iini-
mis for reasons not examined by the Court. If Mexico allows all aliens to
vote, an American-cast ballot could not provoke rational charges of undue
United States participation in the politics of another nation.78 But the Court,
having failed to require the Government to prove Mexican law,79 was unable
to balance the actual likelihood of foreign embarrassment against the harsh-
ness of rendering Perez stateless.
Jalbuena could not have been termed a de minimis case, however, for the
plaintiff created a likelihood of foreign embarrassment by asserting allegiance
to two sovereigns.80 A dual national who, like Jalbuena, acquires both United
States and foreign citizenship at birth and fails formally to disclaim either,
represents a focal point of United States power to the country of his other
nationality.8 ' He owes allegiance to the United States, yet is entitled to the
privileges of foreign citizenship. When subjected to the duties of foreign
citizenship, he may seek to avoid them with the declaration, cisis Anwricanus
sum. s2 Should the State Department then intervene on his behalf,83 the United
78. The effective implementation of our foreign relations may be hindered by the
participation of Americans in the internal affairs of foreign countries. Such participation
is frowned upon by the State Department and may lead to the withdrawal of protection
from an individual. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 59 (1958); 3 HACKWORTH, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW § 278, at 552 (1942) (participation in political activities) ; 2 HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 392-93 (1945) (participation in internal domestic affairs; acts
of hostility). Propaganda based on individual intermeddling in foreign nations' affairs
may have an unfavorable effect upon American foreign relations and policy. See MORGEN-
THAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 197-206 (1949). See also Preuss, International Respon-
sibility for Hostile Propaganda Against Foreign States, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 649 (1.934).
79. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 76-77, 84-85 (1958) (dissenting opinions);
Comment, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1142, 1159 (1958) (indicating that aliens probably were not
allowed to vote in Mexican elections; implying that the Court should not have viewed
the question of voting eligibility as irrelevant).
80. See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915); Guadio v. Dulles, 110
F. Supp. 706, 708-09 (D.D.C. 1953) (dictum); 86 CoNG. Rxc. 11944 (1940) ; H.R. RE.
No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1951); 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 372 (1945);
Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545 (1921); cf. Savorgnan v.
United States, 338 U.S. 491, 500 (1950) ; Hamamoto v. Acheson, 93 F. Supp. 904, 905
(S.D. Cal. 1951).
81. See Wigmore, Domicile, Double Allegiance, and World Citizenship, 21 ILL L.
REV. 761, 761-62 (1927).
82. Compare Acts of the Apostles 22:25-27 (King James) ; CICERO, IN VERREM, bk.
5, ch. 57, 1. 147; ch. 62, 1. 162. See BoRcHARD, DILOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD §§ 257-58 (1919); 3 HAcK wORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 255 (1942); 2 HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 374 (1945); Flournoy, mcpra note 80, at 545, 703; Note, 54
CoLum. L. REV. 932, 938 (1954).
83. Accepted principles of international law are unclear as to whether the United
States may extend diplomatic protection to one of its dual nationals while he is in the
country of his other nationality. In practice, the granting of protection depends upon the
facts of each case and upon whether the individual concerned has manifested allegiance
to the United States. See BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD §§
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States would of necessity be involved in foreign conflict. A refusal to offer
protection, while lessening the possibility of friction, will not eliminate it. That
the individual seeking to avoid the burdens of one citizenship is an American
citizen will by itself highlight both his allegiance to the United States and his
ability to demand special considerations because of that allegiance.
Moreover, thanks to his ambivalent allegiance, the dual national, unlike a
person who is an American citizen only, need not actively participate in the
internal affairs of a foreign country to generate official embarrassment. By
affirming his foreign citizenship through an act such as taking an oath, the
dual citizen leads the country of his other nationality to rely on his alle-
giance. 84 This oath invites the imposition of duties attaching to his foreign
citizenship--duties which give rise both to problems of protection and to com-
peting claims inducing international friction. Whether or not the dual national
is aware of his American citizenship vhen he takes the oath is unimportant.
In either event, his oath is equally significant to the United States. True, un-
apprised of his duality, he will not invoke his American citizenship. But his
continued innocence cannot be assured, and, so long as he is liable to the
claims of his other nationality, he may become a source of conflict. Even if
he cannot use his American citizenship as a protective device, his oath still
serves to expose him to alien demands potentially inconsistent with the re-
sponsibilities of a United States citizen.
Congress may therefore legitimately find that conduct such as jalbiena's
merits expatriation. A dual national's foreign oath poses a far greater possi-
bility of embarrassment than did the balloting in Perez. Furthermore, ex-
patriation works substantially less hardship on a dual national than on an
American with no other country.8 5 The expatriated dual national still retains
257-58 (1919); 3 HAcxwoRTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 255 (1942). See also U.S. DEP'r
OF STATE, PUB. No. 6485, INFORI.MATION FOR BEARERS OF PASSPORTS 20-23 (1957).
84. 'See BORCHARD, DIPLOmATIC PROTECTION OF CiTIzENs ABROAD § 259 (1919); Note,
54 COLUm. L. REv. 932, 938 (1954). The original purpose behind the Nationality Act's
oath provision was to prevent parties from deliberately placing themselves in a position
where their allegiance can be claimed by more than one government. H.R. Doc. No. 326,
59th Cong., ?d Sess. 23 (1906). The 1940 enactment constituted a restatement of this
earlier policy. HOUSE COMMzTTEE PRINT, NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), reprinted in Hearings Before House Conmittee on Int-
migration and Naturalization on H.R. 6127 Superseded by H.R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 405, 490 (1945).
85. See Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1173-78 (1955).
Divesting the dual national of his American citizenship does not appear harsh in
context. When a dual national travels abroad on an American passport, he receives ample
warning of the possible effects of the expatriation statute. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PuB. No. 6485, INFORMATION FOR BEARERS oF PASSPORTS, introduction, 20-23, 27-32
(1.957). The dual national who is unaware of the statute is ordinarily one who has spent
most of his life abroad and is also unaware of his American citizenship. He could hard-
ly be deemed to value a citizenship of which he was unaware and which he never took
the time to ascertain. For the view that American citizenship is a valuable possession
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the citizenship of one country-a citizenship which, in light of his voluntary
conduct, he apparently does not disfavor. Of course, the expatriation statute
alone will not eradicate the potential foreign embarrassment inherent in dual
nationality. Only the elimination of dual nationality can do so. Accordingly,
Congress might reasonably insist that, on attaining his majority, every person
who acquired dual nationality at birth choose one nationality or the other.8 6
which a dual national should be alert to protect, see Soccodato v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 243,
250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
86. Compare Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 693, 705-09
(1921); Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 GEo. WAsr. L. REv. 427,
442-45 (1949) ; Wigmore, supra note 81, at 762. See also note 11 supra, paras. 3-6.
